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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. A Statement Of The Case Indicating Briefly The Nature Of The Case 
This case involves constitutional challenges to Idaho Administrative Code Section 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. ("RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES") and the Idaho Industrial Commission's application of 
that rule to three consolidated Workers Compensation Cases involving claims for attorney's fees. 
The attorney's fees claimed are made by Claimant's counsel (real parties in interest herein) based 
on contract, and not on equitable principles. The decisions under appeal rest on Idaho Industrial 
Commission's application ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and.c to the facts. 
2. The Course Of The Proceedings In The Trial Or The Hearing Below And Its 
Disposition 
The three workers' compensation cases involved in this appeal were each settled on the 
basis of a lump sum agreement. Upon submission of each Lump Sum Agreement to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission for its review and approval, Appellant's law firm was notified by the IIC 
that its fees on the LSA were denied to the extent of25% of the benefits under I.C. 72-408 
attributable to each claimant's permanent impairment rating. Although IDAPA 17.02.08.033.a 
requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the 
requested fee is not reasonable" (see Appendix), the letters from the IIC Claims and Benefits 
Section Manager simply conclude that attorney fees on an unspecified portion of the LSA "have 
not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.01.08.33" without stating any reasons supporting 
that conclusion. AR 33. Similar letters were sent out in Steinmetz, AR 456, and Gomez, AR 555. 
In each of the three cases, Appellant's law firm filed a Request for Approval of Attorney's fees. 
A hearing was held in each case at which Appellant's law firm stipulated that the fees sought 
were not based upon any contention that Appellant's law firm met the standards of IDAP A 
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17.02.08.033.01.a regarding "available funds" and stipulated that it did not contend that the 
services of [its attorneys] operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which 
the attorney seeks to be paid, as effectively required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii as applied 
by the lIe. Appellant's law firm contended that it was entitled to the fees it claimed because 
they are reasonable and based upon enforceable contract limited to the percentages allowed by 
the IIC, and not upon equitable considerations resulting in a "charging lien" as contemplated by 
the regulation. Appellant's law firm further contended that the IDAP A 17.02.08.033 is 
unconstitutional. 
The IIC denied the requested attorney's fees in all cases upon the grounds that 
Appellant's law firm had not met its burden of proof under IDAPA 17.02.08.033 by establishing 
that requested fees were from "available funds" as defined under the regUlation. Kulm, AR 245, 
Steinmetz, AR 508, Gomez, AR 565. Appellant's law firm moved to consolidate all cases on 
appeal, and filed this appeal. 1 
3. Statement of Facts 
This case involves claims for attorney's fees equivalent to twenty five percent of benefits 
attributable to the uncontested permanent impairment sustained by three workers' compensation 
claimants represented by Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. All three Claimants retained Seiniger Law 
Offices prior to any determination that they would sustain a permanent impairment, much less 
1 The case of Cody Drotzman was also consolidated on appeal, however Appellant's law firm moved to 
dismiss its appeal in that case, because in Drotzman, unlike the three remaining consolidated cases, the 
Claimant expressed the need for the disputed funds. Appellant's law firm believes that when a manifest 
conflict of interest arises by virtue of the lIC's present practice of partially approving LSAs and sending 
out letters pronouncing that its fees are unreasonable (of which clients are naturally made aware) the 
combination of its duty to put its clients' interests ahead of its own, and the threat to its reputation for 
doing so, it has a duty to the profession and the client to relinquish any claim to the disputed funds except 
in unusual cases. This is particularly true, because the decisions and orders of the lIC are a matter of 
public record, available online, and are widely read by the workers' compensation insurance industry. 
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that Defendants would agree to pay benefits attributable to any such impairment. While it was 
certainly possible to speculate that each Claimant might be awarded a "PPI" rating, and that the 
Defendants might agree to pay benefits with respect to such a rating, at the time that Seiniger 
Law Offices, P.A. was retained, these eventualities "lay nascent within the womb of time." 
The Written Fee Agreements 
All three Claimants entered into written fee agreements with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
which are of record and identical for purposes of this appeal. Kulm Contingent Fee Agreement, 
AR 7, Steinmetz Contingent Fee Agreement, AR 442, and Gomez Contingent Fee Agreement, AR 
517. Each of the fee agreements provides for 1) the offer and waiver of the right to retain 
Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. on an hourly basis, 2) a graduated scale of contingent fees ranging 
from 25% on certain benefits obtained without a hearing, 30% of benefits obtained as the result 
of a hearing and 40% after an appeal, and 3) the disclosure statement regarding normally 
approved fees required by the IIC. See, Appendix - Key Provisions of Fee Agreements In All 
Three Workers' Compensation Cases On Appeal. 
Legal Services Provided 
Each of the Claimants was provided legal services over a period of more than a year. See 
Table 1 below. At the time Counsel became involved, Counsel regarded all issues as potentially 
disputable because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a workers' compensation 
case unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. Claimants sought the 
services of Counsel as both counselor and advocate. As reflected in the IIC Form 1022 filings, 
in addition to those services particular to each case Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. provided a wide 
variety of legal services to the Claimants including counseling as well as representation. Kulm 
IIC Form 1022, AR 1, Steinmetz IIC Form 1022, AR 434, and Gomez IIC Form 1022, AR 509. 
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Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. provided legal services to each claimant over periods of time ranging 
from more than a year and a half to over four years. For all practical purposes, Seiniger Law 
Offices, P .A. was on retainer to spend whatever time was necessary counseling and representing 
the Claimants for a fee that would not exceed the specified percentages of all amounts obtained 
for the Clients after execution of the fee agreements. This meant that once Seiniger Law Offices, 
P .A. contacted the Defendants and requested benefits be paid to it on behalf of Claimants, it 
would be paid an amount equivalent to 25% of all benefits received (unless a hearing had to be 
held in which case the higher allowed percentage of30% would be paid), though no attorney's 
fees would be taken from any temporary disability benefits if the Claimant was receiving them at 
the time of the execution of the fee agreement, unless the surety threatened to or did discontinue 
those benefits. 
During these time periods, Claimants had available to them virtually all of the resources 
of Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. including two attorneys, one paralegal, and numerous support 
staff. Counsel initiated each case by interviewing Claimants concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and gathering of relevant information concerning the clients' 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history; 
gathered additional background information regarding each Claimant as it related to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc.; advised Claimants as to the procedures involved in 
processing a claim for benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act; advised Claimants 
as to the need for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission 
Rehabilitation Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.; advised Claimants as to the disclosures 
required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; created a database file for Claimants in which 
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pertinent information was recorded for use in the handling of the claim; drafted appropriate 
documents including a written fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the requirements 
of the Idaho Industrial Commission, medical and employment releases, letters of representation 
and inquiry to the sureties and the Idaho Industrial Commission, and letters to medical providers 
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; reviewed all medical 
records, employment records, and other requested documents as they were received. Throughout 
the extended period of time that Appellant's law firm represented each client, its attorneys 
consulted with Claimants about the status of their case on a periodic basis. Typically, the firm's 
paralegal (and often one of the attorneys) had contact with the Claimants on at least a weekly 
basis, coordinating medical appointments, the receipt of benefit checks, etc. 
In each case, Counsel reviewed the Claimant's file in preparation for settlement, engaged 
in extensive negotiations with defendants, had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions, advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs 
that would be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical 
providers, and advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
Counsel obtained compromise settlements with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum 
settlement agreement, completed portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum 
agreement with Claimant. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining certain 
cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel maintained 
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an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to handle 
whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his other 
clients. 
Claimants' Permanent Impairment Ratings 
Each of the three Claimants sustained permanent injuries for which the surety paid PPI 
benefits after Appellant's law firm had been retained. Claimant Kulm sustained a 5% whole 
person impairment as a result of a protruded disk. Kulm LSA, AR 15. Claimant Steinmetz 
sustained a lumbar injury requiring a microdiskectomy resulting in a 12% PPI rating, Steinmetz 
LSA, AR 447, and Claimant Gomez sustained a 2.5% PPI as a result of an injury to her right 
knee, AR 549. The impairment ratings were all awarded after Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. had 
appeared as counsel for the Claimants. 
The Lump Sum Settlements and Attorney's Fees 
Each case was settled on a lump sum basis. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. claimed attorney's 
fees on all monies obtained for the Claimants during the course of their representation from the 
time of retention up to and including monies that were the subject of the LSAs, other than 
medical bills and undisputed TTD benefits that were being paid at the time that it was retained 
and continued to be paid without objection. During the course of representation, benefits were 
paid and attorney's fees were claimed. The lIC followed its usual practice of reviewing the 
Lump Sum Agreements, denying Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.'s requests for attorney's fees on 
Permanent Impairment benefits that were not demonstrated to have been disputed, holding an 
evidentiary hearing on those requests, and ruling on those requests by applying the "available 
funds" standards contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
For purposes of this appeal, Appellant stipulates that his firm cannot prove that its 
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attorneys were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial 
impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for the lump sum 
settlements in question. 2 Appellant stipulates that his firm did not meet the evidentiary standards 
set by IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in all three cases consolidated herein, and that it is not contending 
that the PPI benefits were "available funds" as defined by the regulation. Appellant so stipulates 
so that the Idaho Supreme Court is presented with pure issues of law that do not involve the 
application of the Commission's discretion.3 
ISSUES 
Issues of Statutory Authority 
1. Do IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and the present Idaho Industrial Commission practices with respect 
to its review of the reasonableness of attorney's fees comply with its statutory authority? 
Does I.e. § 72-803 or any other part ofIdaho Code Title 72 impliedly repeal I.e. § 3-205 
that provides "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law 
is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." 
2. Does Idaho Code 72-803 empower the lIC to limit attorney's fees to "disputed" matters under 
the guise of regulation? 
If it does, has the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the lIC? 
Did the lIC exceed its authority in adopting IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq.? 
3. Has the lIC erred in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033 to matters outside of its limited scope? 
What is the scope ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033? 
2 Appellant believes that this was also stipulated in all three cases below, since this was his intent, but so 
stipulates herein to remove any doubt. See, e.g. Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee 
Hearing, AR 467-468. "For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the 
constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it 
cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent 
partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement 
(LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test."" 
3 Indeed, Attorney Alan Hull, counsel for the Defendants in Kulm, testified at hearing that the PPI and 
disability benefits were paid as a result of the work done by Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., but his testimony 
was not offered for that purpose. 
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Does the regulation relied upon by the IIC to deny Appellant's law firm's attorneys fee 
claim authorize regulation of attorney's fees other than those claimed in connection with 
disputed benefits? 
Constitutional Issues 
1. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate Claimants' rights under 
the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the 
Idaho Constitution? 
2. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the guarantee of liberty 
under Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13? 
3. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the doctrine of separation 
of powers by impermissibly delegating legislative authority to the Executive? 
4. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the doctrine of separation 
of powers by invading the province of the Judiciary? 
ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction 
Since prior to Idaho becoming a state, the Idaho law has permitted attorneys and their 
clients to determine the terms of their fee agreement. General Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, 
Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 692, "SEC. 692. The measure and mode of compensation of 
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but 
parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements, as hereinafter 
provided." See, Appendix - Early Statutes. Idaho became a state on July 3, 1890. As of 1909, 
the law remained the same. Revised Code, Part 2 Title 14, Chapter 6, Sec. 4900. See Appendix 
- Early Statutes. 
By 1911, the statute had been amended to add a lien provision and a legislative 
recognition that the right to contract as to the measure and mode of compensation was not 
restrained by law: "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is 
left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." Idaho 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
-8-
Code § 3-205.4 This statutory language effectively codifies what the doctrine of separation of 
powers guarantees; the statute is recognition by the Legislature that it cannot restrain the practice 
of law by limiting the right of a citizen to hire an officer of the Court upon such terms as to 
which both may agree. Only the Judiciary has the "inherent power" to regulate and supervise the 
practice of law. The legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest, 
but in so doing, it acts in aid of the Judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of 
the courts." Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,675,637 P.2d 
1168, 1171 (1981). There is no question that IDAPA 17.02.08.033 does restrain the right of an 
attorney and a client to agree on reasonable terms of compensation. Indeed, the lIC admits that 
this is its very purpose. "It is undeniable that the current regulation impinges upon the right of 
an injured worker, and his or her attorney, to make their own agreement as to how counsel 
should be compensated." AR 247. (Indeed, if one accepts that it is not within the power of the 
IIC to set legislative policy, the lIC has made an admission that it has over-stepped its 
constitutional bounds: "Overriding policy considerations warranted the adoption of [these] 
rules." AR 247.) 
4 Prior to 1911, attorneys had "an equitable lien on a judgments procured by them", but ''the matter of 
procedure, however, in the enforcement of such a lien is not uniformly established." Dahlstrom v. 
Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 110 P. 243, 246 (1910). A statutory attorney lien was added (apparently to 
the language set forth above) in 1911. "It will be noted this statutory lien is much broader than the 
common-law lien. Under the common law the attorney had a lien for the amount of his services which 
obtained as a retaining lien on all papers pertaining to the suit while they were in his possession, and also 
a charging lien on the judgment as against the judgment creditor." Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 300 P. 
362, 363 (1931). It would appear that the statutory lien was added to the pre-existing statutory guarantee 
of the unrestrained (by law) right of an attorney and client to define the terms of their contract. In an 
attorney fee case dealing with facts occurring prior to passage of the 1911 statutory lien, the Idaho 
Supreme Court said: "On the other hand, our statute (section 4900, corresponding with section 1021, Cal.) 
leaves the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys to the agreement, "express or implied," 
between the attorney and client." Merchants' Protective Ass'n v. Jacobsen, 22 Idaho 636, 127 P. 315, 
317-18 (1912). 
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This appeal presents as a matter of first impression a challenge to the statutory authority 
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033,5 the lIC's "Rule Governing Approval Of Attorney Fees In Workers' 
Compensation Cases". Also presented are constitutional challenges to the regulation. However, 
because the Court considers challenges on constitutional grounds only if cases cannot be 
resolved on other grounds, Appellant respectfully suggests that the lack of statutory authority for 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is clear, its conflict with I.e. § 3-205 manifest, and that this Court need not 
reach constitutional issues, but should reverse the decisions below with the observation that the 
Commission lacks the power to restrain the measure and mode of compensation of workers 
compensation attorneys pursuant to I.C. § 3-205, which is a legislative acknowledgment that the 
right of attorneys and clients to determine such terms is not "restrained by law" because it is not 
within the province of the Legislature to do so. Appellant fears that anything less will simply 
prompt special interests to run to the Legislature and seek the repeal ofI.C. § 3-205, inevitably 
resulting in the same constitutional issues having to be submitted to this Court in a later appeal. 
Appellant submits that the Legislature intended to include the language ofLC. § 3-205 
acknowledging that the right to determine the measure and mode of compensation, not as a 
reminder that no such statutory limitations existed at the time that the statute was passed, but 
rather is included as a recognition that the restraint of this right is not a legislative function. Yet, 
Appellant suspects that the lIC's response to this brief will demonstrate that it, at least, does not 
so construe the statute. It would be helpful to all, if this were placed beyond cavil. Thus, 
Appellant asks this Court to simply acknowledge what the Legislature has already declared, 
5IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01-03 sets up a mechanism whereby an attorney can (and as applied must) seek 
approval of fees (which is deemed a request for a "charging lien") in connection with the submission of 
any proposed lump sum settlement. IDAP A 17.02.08.033.02. As construed by the IIC and, according 
to it, this Court, approval can only be given with respect to attorneys fees incurred in connection with 
disputed matters. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
-10 -
which will fully resolve this appeal, and obviate the need to address the constitutionality of this 
and any subsequent similar regulations that are not limited to simply determining the 
reasonableness of attorneys fees without limiting their measure or mode. 
As to the constitutionality of the portions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 that restrict the measure 
and mode of compensation and the services for which an attorney can be paid, the regulation 
interferes with First Amendment and due process rights and liberty interests of Appellant and his 
past, present and potential clients. The First Amendment challenge to the authority of the lIC to 
prohibit compensation for representation other than that relating to "disputed" issues is a matter of 
first impression for this Court. The challenges based upon due process rights and liberty interests 
concern the right to be compensated for work that may not necessarily result in additional benefit 
to the workers' compensation claimant, previously vouched safe in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 
864 P.2d 132, (1993). The regulation, passed by the lIC acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, also 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers by exceeding the limits of the lIC's quasi-legislative 
powers and infringes both upon the legislative authority constitutionally delegated exclusively to 
the Legislature, and the exclusive province of the Judiciary to regulate the practice oflaw. The 
challenge that IDAPA 17.02.08.033's regulation of the character oflegal services for which an 
attorney may be compensated in a workers' compensation case goes beyond the scope of Idaho 
Code § 72-803 's delegation of quasi-legislative power to approve the reasonableness of attorney's 
fees, thereby invading the province of the Legislature, also presents this Court with a matter of 
first impression. In denying Appellant the attorney's fees in dispute in the lIC cases consolidated 
in this appeal, the lIC misread Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139,868 P.2d 467 (1993), a 
case that upheld a different and distinguishable attorney fee regulation against challenges to that 
regulation'S statutory authority and constitutionality. Unlike IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the Rhodes 
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regulation did not limit attorney's fees to "disputed" matters. Neither did Rhodes present a 
challenge to the subject regulation based upon its clear conflict with Idaho Code Title 3 Chapter 
2 dealing with the "Rights And Duties Of Attorneys" and specifically with the measure and 
mode of attorney's fees, or a challenge based upon the First Amendment issues raised in this 
appeal. 
2. What Is Not At Issue In This Case 
Appellant believes that it may be helpful to an understanding of the issues that his firm 
presents on appeal to recognize that which is conceded by it for purposes of appeal. Appellant 
concedes that the following do not, in and of themselves, infringe upon his constitutional rights, 
due process, or the separation of powers guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution: 
1. It is within the police power of the Idaho Legislature to protect Idaho's workers from 
being charged unreasonable attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases. 
2. The Idaho Legislature can enact legislation limiting attorney's fees in workers' 
compensation cases to those that are reasonable. 
3. The Idaho Legislature can delegate to the Executive (in this case the Idaho Industrial 
Commission) the power to enact valid regulations pursuant to which it may review 
attorney fee claims in workers' compensation cases to ensure that they are reasonable. 
4. Pursuant to the authority granted to the lIC by I.C. §72-803, it can review claims for 
attorney's fees and disapprove any and all claims for such fees as are unreasonable. 6 
5. A percentage contingent fee cap is not per se unreasonable and it is not per se 
unconstitutional, though it does go beyond the lIC's statutory authority. 
6. It is possible for the lIC to pass a valid regulation for the purposes of approving claims of 
attorney's fees that takes into account whether the attorney "primarily or substantially" 
6 "By definition, a contingent fee is both a contingency and a fee. Any time a fee is charged there exists 
the possibility of overreaching by the attorney. To that extent, a contingent fee is like any other fee and is 
subject to the same standards of reasonableness as any other fee." Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261,265,629 
P.2d 657, 661 (1981) 
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secured an "available fund" of benefits for his client. Stated another way, it does not 
violate either the Idaho or United States Constitutions, and it is not beyond the authority 
ofthe lIC to consider whether the attorney "primarily or substantially" secured an 
"available fund" of benefits in determining whether a claim for attorney's fees is 
"reasonable. " 
If the actions of the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho Industrial Commission were so limited, 
Appellant would have no basis for this appeal, despite the fact that he might well have obtained 
the same result below, and despite the fact that either or both the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho 
Industrial Commission had acted in his judgment unwisely. However, there is a great difference 
between disappointment and the denial of rights. 
3. What Is At Issue In This Case 
Fundamentally, the attorney fee regulation in question, IDAP A 17.02.08.033, does not 
simply create a procedure pursuant to the authority granted to the lIC by I.C. §72-803 for the 
submission and "approval" of claims for attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases, or even 
"regulate" such fees by setting a cap on contingent fees. IDAPA 17.02.08.033 goes further by 
effectively and impermissibly legislating the types of services that a workers' compensation 
claimant can retain an attorney to perform. This legislation goes beyond the power delegated to 
the lIC by I.C. § 72-503 and 803, conflicts with the rights conferred on attorneys to determine 
the "measure and mode" of their compensation with their clients conferred by I.C. § 3-205, 
infringes upon Appellant's constitutional rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions, 
and violates the Separation of Powers provisions of Idaho's Constitution. The regulation is 
fundamentally different than the one upheld against similar, but not identical, constitutional 
challenges in Rhodes v. Indus. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993). 
As to Separation of Powers, Idaho's judicial department is uniquely imbued with the 
power to regulate the practice oflaw. Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Util., 102 Idaho 672, 
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675,637 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1981).7 "Where the practice oflaw intersects with a social system 
such as the workers' compensation system, the judicial power does not merge, but remains 
plenary. Any authority exercised by the other departments of government that affects the practice 
of law must not conflict with judicial resolution." Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139, 141, 
868 P.2d 467,469 (1993). As will be demonstrated, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 not only violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers as regards the authority and province of the Judiciary, it also 
does so as respects that of the Legislature. 
At bottom, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 effectively creates an irrebuttable presumption that all 
attorneys' fees other than those claimed as a result of prevailing on a disputed matter are 
unreasonable. In direct conflict with the teachings of Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132, 
(1993), IDAPA 17.02.08.033 as applied prohibits an attorney and his or her workers' 
compensation client from agreeing that the attorney will be paid for acting as a counselor, or for 
lending the force of his experience, skill, professional reputation, and the resources of his office 
to the workers' compensation claimant, or for tactically or strategically heading off a dispute 
over benefits, or otherwise. Ironically, notwithstanding the strong judicial policy in favor of 
settlement, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 creates an incentive for the attorney to polarize the client's 
case by filing a complaint the minute that he is retained, so that he will at least have some idea of 
what was disputed at the time that he was retained, since years hence, the sole issue that he is 
likely to have to litigate is his right to attorney's fees. Yet, even that tactic is likely destined to 
accomplish little, since most of the issues that arise in a workers' compensation claim are not 
7 It would appear to follow logically that if only the Judiciary can "regulate" the practice of law, any 
"regulation" passed by a coordinate branch of government ought to at least reflect the Judiciary's 
recognition of the factors of reasonableness discussed with respect to I.C. § 72-804, not under 
consideration in this appeal, and could not interpose impediments to the retention by a Claimant of an 
officer of the Court unrelated to the reasonableness of the fee agreed to by the attorney and his client. 
See, Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132, (1993) Fn. 4. 
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necessarily presented at the time of retention, but at points in time generally well beyond the 
time that the attorney was retained, from whence the reasonableness of an attorney fee agreement 
must be judged "prospectively rather than retrospectively." Curr, 693, 139. Fn. 4, see, also, 
Clarkv. Sage, 102 Idaho 261,263,629 P.2d 657,659 (1981). 
4. IDAP A 17.02.08.033 Exceeds The lie's Statutory Authority 
Under well-established Idaho law, IDAPA 17.02.08.033, I.C. § 72-508 (granting the lIC 
authority to adopt rules and regulations "not inconsistent with law") and I.e. § 72-803 
(subjecting claims of attorneys to the approval of the lIC) must be read in conjunction with I.e. § 
3-205 and construed so that the statutes are harmonized if possible. Courts have been said to be 
under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done: 
Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or 
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. [Citations omitted.] 
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and 
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. When there 
are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible ... The 
intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.' 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2483, 41 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1974). 2B 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 53: 1 (7th ed.). When the validity of a legislative act is 
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal 
principle that courts must first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, 
concurring); Supreme Court Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 
Colum. L. Rev. 633 (1953). 
"If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there 
would be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate 
representation. Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain 
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exceptional and well-qualified counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that 
courts foster and protect the ability of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his 
choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice which would discourage [ such] 
representation .... " See also Jennings v. Gabaldon, 97 N.M. 416, 640 P.2d 522 
(N.M.App.1982); Dobbins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 280 So.2d 582 
(La.App.1973 ). 
Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 17,684 P.2d 990, 994 (1984). Hogaboom, while 
not controlling with respect to claims for attorney's fees under I.C. 72-803, and Curr both reflect 
the long standing position of this Court that the relationship between the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees and the ability to obtain counsel and to practice law are intimately intertwined. 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is an unprecedented departure from this tradition, in that the regulation 
does not confine itself to the adoption of a process for determining the reasonableness of an 
attorney fee. 
Appellant is not aware of any authority for the proposition that the adoption of I.C. §72-
803 providing for the approval of attorney's fees impliedly repealed the I.C. § 3-205 express and 
unequivocal prohibition against limiting the freedom to contract of an attorney and client: "The 
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, 
express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in fact 
outlaws fees for all legal services other than those rendered with respect to a dispute and sets up 
a "charging lien.,,8 "It is presumed the legislature does not intend to make any changes in the 
existing law beyond that which it expressly declares." Rydalch v. Glauner, 83 Idaho 108, 115, 
357 P.2d 1094, 1098 (1960), (Knudson and McQuade, dissenting). 
It has long been the law of Idaho that "[T]he repeal of statutes by implication is not 
8 Interestingly, one of the Industrial Commissioners has queried in casual conversation whether claims for 
contingent attorneys fees may be barred by the anti-assignment language ofLC. §72-802. Such a concern 
only arises if one assumes that the lien created by I.C. § 3-205 is not to be read in pari materia or 
otherwise harmonized with the Workers Compensation Act. 
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favored. In the absence of express terms, it will be presumed that the legislature did not intend by 
a later act to repeal a former one, if by a fair and reasonable constitution, effect can be given to 
both. To overcome such presumption, the two acts must be irreconcilable, i. e. clearly repugnant, 
as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent 
operation." [Citations Omitted.] State ex rei. Goodv. Boyle, 67 Idaho 512, 523-24,186 P.2d 
859,866 (1947). See, also, Golconda Lead Mines v. Neill, 82 Idaho 96,101,350 P.2d 221, 223 
(1960). 
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, 
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum. "Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will 
not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d 290,301. 
"The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that when the mind of the legislator has been 
turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general 
terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the 
original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive 
previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a 
construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all." T. Sedgwick, The 
Interpretation and Construction o/Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874). 
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153,96 S. ct. 1989, 1992-93,48 L. Ed. 2d 
540 (1976). Emphasis supplied. No one can seriously argue that the passage ofI.C. §72-803 
contains a clear intention to repeal the right of a lawyer and his client to enter into an agreement 
defining the terms of the lawyer's engagement. In no way are the right of an attorney and client 
to agree on a reasonable fee pursuant to I.C. § 3-205 and the power of the lIC to approve fees 
I.C. § 72-803 repugnant, a point that was not discussed in Rhodes. Since I.C. § 72-803 did not 
repeal I.C. § 3-205, the lIC lacks statutory authority to limit the measure and mode of a worker's 
compensation attorney's compensation other than upon the grounds of reasonableness. 
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5. The Adoption of IDAP A 17.02.08.033 As Construed And Applied by the IIC 
Violated The Doctrine of Separation of Powers As Regards Both the 
Judiciary and the Legislature 
In adopting IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the IIC clearly exceeded its power under I.C. § 72-803 
and transgressed into both the realm of legislation, exclusively reserved to the legislature, and 
the regulation of the practice of law, exclusively reserved to the Judiciary. 
While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the legislature, 
(Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15) "the legislature may constitutionally leave to 
administrative agencies the selection of the means and the time and place of the execution 
of the legislative purpose, and to that end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations." 
State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78 P.2d 125, 128 (1938). Administrative agencies do 
this by enacting rules and regulations. See Idaho Code tit. 67, ch. 52. 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410, 414 (1990) 
This Court, speaking through a number of eminent jurists, has rather consistently defined 
the nature of that which results from rules and regulations adopted by executive agencies 
by virtue of authority delegated to such agencies from the legislature. 
Sullivan, J., speaking for the Court in Idaho Power Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 141 
P. 1083 (1914), described the authority delegated by legislative act by quoting language 
from the United States Supreme Court contained in Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. 
Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194,32 S.Ct. 436, 56 L.Ed. 729 (1912): 
[T]he congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, 
having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall 
proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to 
particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in 
a particular matter within the rules laid down by the congress. 
Continuing, the Court quoted Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 
(1892), as follows: 
"The true distinction," as Judge Ranney, speaking for the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
has well said, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which 
necessarily involves a [sic.] discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring 
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance 
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." 
William A. Lee, J., spoke for the Court in State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 649, 228 P. 796, 
797 (1924), as follows: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power 
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to 
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any other body or authority." 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664-65, 791 P.2d 410, 414-15 (1990). Emphasis supplied. 
Clearly, there is a huge distinction between delegating to the lIC the power to determine the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees, which violates neither the province of the legislature nor the 
Judiciary, and delegating to the IIC the power to determine what services an attorney may be 
compensated for whether the charge is reasonable or not. It is a distinction that from a 
constitutional perspective makes all of the difference in the world. 
The bottom line is this: There are only two logical possibilities. Either the Idaho 
Legislature did not delegate the power to repeal I.C. § 3-205's statutory protection of the very 
rights that Appellant also contends enjoy some constitutional protection ("The measure and 
mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or 
implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law."), or it did delegate that power to the lIC. 
If the Legislature did not delegate such authority, the regulation is void as going beyond the 
lIC's statutory authority. Ifit did delegate such authority, that delegation was unconstitutional 
under the doctrine of separation of powers. 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 violates the doctrine of separation of powers as to the Judiciary 
because it limits compensation to "disputed" matters and thereby regulates not just fees but 
effectively the areas of law that an attorney may practice. 
The Idaho Constitution grants to this Court the judicial power of the state. Idaho Const. 
art. 5, § 2. Article 5, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution limits the legislature's power when it 
involves state courts exercising their judicial powers. It states in pertinent part: 
§ 13. Power of legislature respecting courts.-The legislature shall have no power 
to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly 
pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the 
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methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the 
Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this 
Constitution .... (Emphasis added.) 
Holly Care Ctr. v. State, Dept. o/Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 81, 714 P.2d 45,50 (1986). The 
steady onslaught of so-called "tort reform" has perhaps desensitized some with respect to the 
constitutional issues implicated by legislative limitations on attorney compensation. However, 
Appellant believes this Court would conclude that the legislature had strayed over the line and 
attempted to "deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains 
to it as a coordinate department of the government. " if the legislature were to pass a law that no 
one with a net worth of less than $100,000 could hire a lawyer under the guise of an exercise of 
the police power, or that no corporation could hire in-house counsel because of a concern that the 
counsel would not be independent, or that Defendants could not hire counsel in workers' 
compensation cases because relief is to be sure and certain and the legislature as a result of 
"exhaustive study" had determined that defense counsel undermined that goal, 
6. IDAP A 17.02.08.033 Violates Appellant's And Claimants' Rights Under The 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
Rhodes did not address a First Amendment challenge. The lIC has apparently determined 
that workers compensation claimants must be protected from having to pay for the advice of 
counsel and representation by counsel in "undisputed" matters.9 The First Amendment protects 
the right to petition an administrative agency. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,92 S. Ct. 611, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1972). The ability to pay even a non-
9 In an informal conversation with one of the lIe's "claims consultants", Appellant raised the point that he 
felt entitled to be paid for advising his clients as to all manner of matters that might not be presently 
disputed but which were critical to future benefits that might become disputed. Appellant was advised 
that this was what the claims consultants were for, and that Appellant should simply refer his clients to 
the claims consultants for such advice and counsel. 
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lawyer to speak on one's behalf carries with it First Amendment implications. Meyer v. Grant, 
486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1988).10 The existence of commercial 
activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the 
First Amendment. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474, 86 S.Ct. 942, 949, 16 L.Ed.2d 
31 (1966). As evidenced by the IIC Form 1022s in the record, Appellant's law firm was retained 
to provide legal advice, and represent the Claimants both formally before the IIC and to speak 
for the Claimants in communications with the representatives of the Defendants. Speech is 
protected even when "in a form that is sold for profit." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350,363,97 S. Ct. 2691,2699,53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977). One would assume that if the 
informational value of lawyer advertising were worthy of constitutional protection, the right to 
be paid for legal advice actually given once the lawyer is retained and representation commenced 
would also merit such protection. 
Even though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such 
speech in certain contexts. See, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 
1918,23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 
1093 (1940). The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free 
flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political 
dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, 
though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues 
of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). 
And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices 
of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of 
resources in a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 
603-604,87 S.Ct. 1224, 1242-1243, 18 L.Ed.2d 303 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In 
short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and 
reliable decision making. 425 U.S., at 761-765,96 S.Ct., at 1825-1827. 
Bates, 364,2699. Emphasis supplied. It cannot be seriously argued that Appellant's right to 
advertise the fact that he is available to give legal advice enjoys constitutional protection, but his 
10 Meyer was decided in the context of public political speech, yet Appellant submits that property 
interests in workers compensation benefits and right of his clients to petition the lIe in this and other 
cases are of analogous stature. 
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right to give the advice and his clients' rights to receive that advice is not. In this regard, both 
the rights of the Appellant and his clients are violated by IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
7. IDAP A 17.02.08.033 Is Unconstitutional As Applied 
The challenges raised by this appeal implicate two prior cases dealing directly with 
constitutional challenges to the actions of the Idaho Industrial Commission, and additional cases 
that have impacted that of the lIC. 
Currv. Curr 
In Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 Pold 132, (1993), counsel for four Workers 
Compensation Claimants successfully challenged the lIC's practice of sua sponte reducing the 
percentage of the attorney's contingent fees in the absence of applicable regulations, notice or an 
opportunity to be heard. This Court held: 
"The Commission's procedural misconduct is compounded by constitutional 
transgressions. The Commission has waded into regulatory conduct with indifference to 
constitutional requirements that adhere to rights fixed by a private contract. An attorney 
fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and appellants performed 
services for their clients in reliance on the terms of the fee agreements. It is clear that, in 
Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract 
that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Cleveland Bd of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 
S.Ct. 1487, 1495,84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Application of Forde L. Johnson Oil Co., 84 
Idaho 288, 372 Pold 135 (1962). In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful 
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. Jones v. State Bd of 
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P. 
491 (1923). 
Curr 691, 137. Emphasis supplied. In analyzing Curr, this Court observed 
"The Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has specifically 
granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction, with nothing being 
presumed in favor of its jurisdiction." See Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 
102 Idaho 744, 750,639 Pold 442,448 (1981). * * * Under I.C. § 72-803, the 
Commission has a duty to approve or disapprove attorney fee claims. The basis for 
approval depends upon a finding that the fee agreement sails the wake of reasonableness. 
Reasonableness, in tum, derives from the totality ofthe circumstances from the 
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perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made. * * * As a 
creature of legislative invention, the Commission may only act pursuant to an enumerated 
power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and regulations properly 
issued by the Commission under I.C. § 72-508. * * * In acting beyond the bounds of its 
statutory authority the Commission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and has 
manifestly abused its discretion. 
Curr, 690-691, 136-137. In other words, assuming that the Idaho Supreme Court correctly 
construed I.C. § 72-803 in Curr, the IIC was delegated the power by the Idaho Legislature to 
determine whether attorney's fees are reasonable in workers' compensation cases, but not 
necessarily the far greater power reserved to the Judiciary to determine the categories of services 
for which an attorney can be compensated. Only the Judiciary can determine what constitutes 
the practice of law, and concomitantly for what services a lawyer acting always as an officer of 
the Court can charge a reasonable fee. 
The importance of this distinction is reinforced by this Court's observation: 
In effecting the attorney fee modifications under the claimed authority ofI.C. § 72-803 
where there is no fee dispute, the Commission is acting in its quasi-legislative as opposed to 
its quasi-judicial capacity. The Commission must accordingly act within the bounds of its 
legislatively delegated authority and of the omnipresent mantle of the United States 
Constitution. 
Curr, 691, 137. Emphasis supplied. To this the undersigned would add that the fee agreement 
enjoys the same, or perhaps even more robust, protection under the doctrine of separation of 
powers contained in the Idaho Constitution. "The right to follow a recognized and useful 
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13," vouched safe by Curr, would mean little 
if the Legislature or Executive could effectively void that guarantee by passing a law or 
regulation declaring it illegal to pay for such services. Although the right to contract is not 
infringed where a contract entered into subsequent to the passage of valid regulations is limited 
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by an otherwise lawful regulatory environment, the same is not necessarily true (as assumed by 
the lIC) with respect to the liberty interest of the attorney to enter into a contract pursuant to I.C. 
§ 3-205, particularly in view of the lIC's failure to observe Curr's teaching as to the point 
beyond which neither "regulation" nor "approval" may go: 
Specifically, the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to 
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize efforts that 
do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or 
procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made 
suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes oftheir clients, thereby seriously undermining the 
attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new money" provision preempts representation 
other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-508. 
Curr 692, 138. Contrary to the interpretation given Curr by the IIC, the analysis in Curr is not 
limited to the procedural infirmities of the IIC's sua sponte reduction of attorney's fees. 
Although Curr required the IIC to cure the Contract Clause and Due Process Clause deficiencies 
of its sua sponte practices by adopting valid procedures regulating the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees, it did not hold that all such procedures were constitutionally valid even if they 
infringed on the substantive rights contained in the foregoing passage. The foregoing passage in 
Curr demonstrates it is beyond the lIC's power to "fail to compensate an attorney for acting 
solely as a counselor," to "fail to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as 
obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment rating," and to "[preempt] 
representation other than in disputed matters [in contravention of] I.C. § 72-508." Curr, 692, 
138. The clear implication of Curr is that the IIC could not do this because it had not been 
delegated that power by the Idaho Legislature by virtue of the adoption ofI.C. § 72-508, and 
because doing so violated the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation as protected by 
a constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. By limiting attorney's fees to "disputed" matters, IDAP A 
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17.02.08.033 flies in the face of this constitutional prohibition. 
Finally, Curr mandates "Under the terms of1.C. § 72-803, the Commission upon making 
the threshold determination of unreasonableness must fix (approve) attorney fees." Curr 693, 
139. (Emphasis in the original.) Curr noted that the reasonableness factors articulated in 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13,684 P.2d 990 (1984), and Clarkv. Sage, 102 
Idaho 261,629 P.2d 657 (1981), "offer helpful, but not determinative, factors to be thoughtfully 
considered when ascertaining reasonableness." Curr, 690, 136. Reasonableness, in tum, derives 
from the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee 
agreement was made. Curr 690, 136. As applied by the IIC (and according to it this Court) the 
present regulation deals with the Hogaboom and Clark reasonableness factors essentially by 
eliminating them other than with respect to fees generated from "disputed" matters. I I As to 
compensation for "an attorney for acting solely as a counselor," "efforts that do not generate 
monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment 
rating," and "representation other than in disputed matters" IDAPA 17.02.08.033 effectively 
determines a priori any such attorney's fees are per se unreasonable by prohibiting them. 
Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n 
Contrary to the IIC, Rhodes does not support the constitutionality of IDAPA 
17.02.08.033. Rhodes declared that the issues it was addressing were: 
1. Whether the Commission has exceeded its statutory authority by enacting a 
comprehensive regulation governing attorney fees for claimants' attorneys. 
II. Whether the regulation enacted violates the United States Constitution or the Idaho 
Constitution. 
II "'Reasonable' means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be satisfied from 
available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(e). 
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Rhodes 141,469. Though the majority opinion in Rhodes does not identify or set forth the 
regulation at issue, the dissent written by Justice Trout does: 
The specific regulation at issue provides: 
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. After the effective 
date of this regulation, any contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a 
workers' compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed 
25% of any new money received by the claimant, whether such new money is acquired 
pursuant to a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, other Agreement, Mediation, or an 
award of the Commission. 
a. Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission and upon its own 
motion, the Commission may award attorney fees up to 30% of new money 
awarded. 
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and permanently disabled, attorney 
fees may be deducted from no more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation 
benefits. 
Rhodes 143,471. The confusion of the lIC as to the import of Rhodes is understandable, because 
despite Curr's prohibition against limiting attorney's fees to "new money," that exact term was 
used in the regulation under consideration in Rhodes. Justice Trout's citation to ~4 of the 
regulation under consideration in Rhodes did not include the definition of "new money" 
contained in ~3: 
3. "New Money" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer to monetary benefits to 
the claimant that counsel is responsible for securing through legal services rendered in 
connection with the client's workers' compensation claim. 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803D. AR 247. Emphasis supplied. "Secured" as used in this definition most 
closely means to "succeed in obtaining" (Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th Ed) or 
"to get hold or possession of; procure; obtain" (http://dictionary.reference.com), or "to put 
beyond hazard oflosing or of not receiving" (Merriam Webster English Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary). The regulation at issue in Rhodes did not limit an 
attorney's right to be paid to "disputed" matters or "available funds" "primarily or substantially" 
secured by the services of the attorney. In effect, the regulation at issue in Rhodes was a 
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percentage cap on attorney's fees on the moneys paid out pursuant to a negotiated settlement or 
as the result of a hearing in which the attorney acted to "secure" his client's rights to such funds. 
The "new money" was simply all of the money received by the Claimant "secured" by the 
negotiation of a lump sum settlement, at mediation or at hearing. 12 
This distinction is a critical one because despite the characterization of worker's relief 
being "sure and certain," no workers' compensation claimant's right to benefits is ever "secure" 
in the sense in which that word was employed in the regulation under consideration in Rhodes. 
In most workers' compensation cases the claimant's rights to future benefits unfold over 
a period of months or years, and are influenced by factors that often cannot be ascertained at the 
time that the attorney is employed, when it is often unknown if the injury will be permanent, how 
long the claimant may be on medical leave, what the claimant's future medical needs will be, 
whether the claimant will need retraining, or how any permanent medical condition may impact 
the claimant's access to the labor market. The Defendants retain the absolute right to contest all 
of these factual issues unless admitted, which they seldom if ever are at the outset of a case. 13 
12 Indeed, this is how IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the regulation under consideration in this case, was 
interpreted until most recently: "We -- the present stance with regard to what benefits are recoverable and 
what constitutes disputed, have changed. Okay? And the reason that that's important is that the Supreme 
Court has said that one of the Constitutional requirements and rights that we have is that there are clear 
guidelines as to what we are entitled to take a fee on. Now, I have done this for about 30 years and since 
Kerr [sic.] was decided and the new regulations were passed, up until about a year ago it was possible to 
pass the threshold with the claims consultants simply by saying -- they said, well, give us a letter that 
shows that you requested the impairment rating and that's satisfactory. Okay. The present decision and 
what we get out of the -- the informal determination is that that is no longer enough. That we have to 
show, number one, that there is a dispute and we have to show, essentially, that we overcame the 
wrestling match. Okay? Now, if these are to be clear guidelines, it is impossible for both of those 
interpretations of the same regulation to be correct." Testimony of Appellant, Transcript of Kulm 
Hearing, p. 261. 24 to p. 271. 18. 
13 As the record reflects, the fee agreements entered into between appellant and his clients provides: "If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the execution of this agreement, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an impairment rating which has been admitted 
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The vast majority of workers' compensation cases are settled through the Lump Sum process. 
As a result of the negotiation of a Lump Sum Agreement, the Claimant's unliquidated and 
generally contestable claim to statutory benefits is liquidated and converted to an enforceable 
contract right. 14 Under the definition of "new money" in the regulation under consideration in 
Rhodes, negotiation of the Lump Sum Agreement secured the monetary benefits. In contrast, the 
artful definition of "available funds" contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a) as applied simply 
resurrects the constitutionally invidious limitation of attorney's fees to "new money" as that term 
was employed in Curro 
Appellant is aware that the lIC relies primarily on Rhodes in support of the attorney fee 
provisions of IDAPA 17.02.08.033. Despite the fact that the decisions under appeal herein 
discuss Rhodes at length, rather than anticipate the lIC's contentions in this regard, Appellant 
will reserve additional discussion of Rhodes for his reply brief. 
Mancilla v. Greg and Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp. 
The lIC relies on Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 688, 963 P.2d 368,371 (1998) and 
and is being paid, Attorney will not take a percentage of the balance of the impainnent rating unless it is 
later disputed." AR 7, 442, 517. 
14 Appellant respectfully suggests, and hopefully without appearing to be presumptuous, that it may be 
productive for the Court in this case and in others in which attorneys fees are at issue, to place some focus 
on the concept of the liquidation of a claim. "Liquidated", as defined by Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009) means "(Of an amount or debt), settled or detennined, esp. by agreement." "liquidated claim" 
means" 1. A claim for an amount previously agreed on by the parties or that can be precisely detennined 
by operation of law or by the tenns of the parties' agreement. 2. A claim that has been detennined in a 
judicial proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Whether in the context of workers 
compensation or other areas such as the application of the Common Fund Doctrine, it is generally the 
establishment of the client's or another's rights to a fund of money through the liquidation of a claim and 
the creation of a contractual right to fund or the right to execute on a judgment that confers the real 
benefit on the client or other beneficiary. Though collection of the obligation remains, as a practical 
matter in the vast majority of cases the monies are paid by an insurance company, and the real 
accomplishment by the attorney was the liquidation of the claim by negotiation of the settlement or the 
victory in Court. 
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Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000) in support of its construction 
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 as prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees other than with respect to 
"disputed" matters. Neither Mancilla nor Johnson raised the constitutional challenges to IDAPA 
17.02.08.033 raised herein, but together they evidence the appropriateness of this Court seriously 
considering such challenges in this case. Mancilla involved an unsuccessful challenge to the 
lIC's exercise of discretion in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033. The Mancilla Court simply held 
"Based upon a review of the entire record, we hold that there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that Pena did not primarily or substantially 
assist in securing the PPI award." Mancilla 688-89, 371-72. Mancilla is significant, because it 
construed IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and 01.e to prohibit "undisputed funds" from being used to 
satisfy claims for attorney fees, though the lIC has acknowledged that this construction may be 
dicta. AR 221-222. 15 
In upholding the lIC's exercise of discretion in Johnson, the Court reasoned "All of this 
testimony supports the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed at encouraging Boise 
Cascade to accept full responsibility for the medical bills related to the two later surgeries, which 
they questioned but fully accepted immediately after consulting with outside counsel, not as a 
result of anything Pena did." Johnson 353, 738. The implication of this observation, is that an 
15 A careful reading of the 17.02.08.033.0 1.a and 01.e makes it clear that the regulation does not, by its 
terms, prohibit attorneys fees from being paid from undisputed funds other than those "not disputed to be 
owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney." If anything, the regulation permits attorneys 
fees to be taken from funds "not disputed to be owed" subsequent "to claimant's agreement to retain the 
attorney." "It is a universally recognized rule of construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies 
certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State 
Legislature of the State, 142 Idaho 640,642, 132 P.3d 397,399 (2006). Interpretation begins with an 
examination of the statute's or rule's literal words. State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825,827, 172 P.3d 1100, 
1102 (2007); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a 
rule is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the rule as written, without engaging in construction. 
In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 479, 210 P.3d 584,587 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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inference arose from the timing of Boise Cascade's acceptance of responsibility that it acted on 
the advice of counsel. As a matter of judicial policy, requiring the showing apparently mandated 
by Mancilla should be avoided because it invites the invasion of the Defendants' attorney-client 
privilege to the extent that Defendants either offer proof that they paid benefits on advice of 
counsel, or offer such an inference. Ifit is the workers' compensation claimant's attorney's 
burden of proof to overcome such inferences, he should be permitted in discovery to inquire into 
all aspects of the motivation ofthe adjuster in agreeing to pay a benefit, including any 
communications with counsel that were a part of that motivation. Since Defendants are liable for 
paying punitive attorney's fees for unreasonable denials of benefits under I.C. § 72-804, they are 
unlikely to admit that benefits were paid only as a result of the demands of workers' 
compensation claimants' counsel, and have every reason to contend, and likely believe, that they 
paid such benefits purely because they independently recognized their obligation to do so. 
Troubling implications arise from placing the burden of proof on workers' compensation 
claimants' counsel to prove after the fact, particularly after a confidential mediation, what was 
disputed as a predicate to recovery of any attorney's fees, and allowing evidence from the 
defendants that they relied upon the advice of counsel in deciding to pay such fees without 
dispute, or similar inferences, without allowing the attorney seeking fees to test the credibility of 
such evidence and inferences. 
For these reasons, though the judicial policy implications of IDAPA 17.02.08.033 do not 
directly raise constitutional issues, they do impact the analysis of whether or not IDAP A 
17.02.08.033 in its present form and application goes beyond regulating the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees and intrudes upon the broader plain of the regulation of the practice of law 
reserved exclusively to the Judiciary under the separation of powers provisions of the Idaho 
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Constitution. 
8. IDAPA 17.02.08.033 As Construed In Johnson Intrudes Upon The Province 
Of The Judiciary And Conflicts With Judicial Policy By Creating Ethical 
Problems Directly Affecting The Practice Of Law 
Requiring attorneys after the fact to justify their attorney's fees solely on the basis of 
whether or not all of the fees claimed are derived from the recovery of "disputed" funds, creates 
problems that directly effect the practice oflaw that Appellant respectfully suggests should be of 
enormous concern to this Court. "The principle that neither the legislature nor the executive can 
in any way regulate or alter the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is basic to the doctrine of separation 
of powers. Idaho Constitution, art. 2, § 1." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 663, 791 P.2d 410, 
413 (1990). One of the ways in which this Court regulates the practice oflaw is through the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. LR.P.C. 1.2(c) provides: "A lawyer may limit the scope of 
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent." Iflawyers in workers' compensation cases can only be paid with respect to 
disputed matters, presumably they can limit the scope of their representation to disputed matters 
pursuant to LR.P.C. 1.2(c). However, such a dichotomy of roles, while plausible in the abstract, 
would create a hornet's nest of ethical problems in practice, not only for claimant's attorneys, but 
for the attorneys representing the Defendants. 
Suppose that an attorney agrees to represent a client in all disputed matters in connection 
with a pending workers' compensation claim shortly after the worker suffers an accident. At the 
time that the attorney is engaged, the Defendants are paying the claimant's medical bills and 
have begun to pay time loss (TTD) benefits. However, it is almost always the case that the 
duration, if not the extent, of the injury is the subject of speculation. So too, it is generally 
unclear what position the Defendants will take as to whether or not they will pay an impairment 
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rating, or how much, if any, disability above impairment they will agree to pay, or for how long 
they will pay time loss benefits, since defendants often obtain an Independent Medical 
Evaluation to justify cutting off those benefits even when the treating physician whom they have 
a right to pick has not released the patient. 
Indeed, at the moment that a potential workers' compensation client sits down for the 
first interview with the attorney, there is almost never any guarantee that any benefits will 
continue, and the defendants' right to contest all future benefits or even request reimbursement 
for past benefits is open to them. In reality, in many cases nothing is disputed when the lawyer is 
first consulted, yet the workers' compensation claimant distrusts the representative of the surety 
or the employer or both and wants to hire counsel. The lawyer explains to the potential client 
that pursuant to 17.02.08.033.01 he can only be paid with respect to disputed matters, and drafts 
a fee agreement advising the client that the scope of his engagement is limited to such matters. 
The client agrees to sign the agreement, but has questions about the workers' compensation 
process. The lawyer explains that he would love to help the client, but because the fee 
agreement can be orally modified by implication, he must decline to answer questions about 
anything that does not go to a disputed matter. The lawyer declines reluctantly, because he 
knows from decades of experience that cases often are won or lost based on matters that have to 
be finessed, and which are beyond the ken of laymen unfamiliar with the workers' compensation 
system. Most of these are individually small matters, such as what to be aware of when 
attending a so-called independent medical examination; what to be cautious of when giving a 
statement to a representative of the defendants; the way to interact with human resources if the 
claimant feels that he is not able to work within the restrictions given by his physician; what it 
means when a van with tinted windows parks across the street for prolonged periods; how to 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
- 32-
remind the employer of its duties under the ADA and FMLA that are implicated by the 
claimant's medical condition; or anyone of a thousand other matters that typically arise in such 
cases, to say nothing of the ceaseless struggle with sureties to pay claimants their time loss 
benefits promptly. 
The attorney then contacts the defense counsel. He advises her in writing that he has 
been engaged to represent the workers' compensation claimant only with respect to disputed 
matters. He further advises defense counsel that it is his understanding that there are no disputed 
matters at present, and that defense counsel is therefore free to communicate exclusively with the 
claimant until such time as a dispute arises, and that he leaves it to defense counsel to determine 
for herself when a dispute has arisen. Then, and only then, is the defense counsel to 
communicate with him, but as to all matters which remain undisputed, defense counsel is to 
continue to communicate directly with the client. The attorney advises defense counsel that he 
apologizes for the inconvenience, but because he does not want to expand the scope of his 
representation implicitly, he is going to have to insist on this, and he warns defense counsel that 
she should not construe this request to in any way relieve her of her ethical obligations under 
LR.P.C. 4.2, stressing that he only consents to direct communications with the workers' 
compensation claimant as to undisputed matters. 
As the Court can easily appreciate, such a scenario would be a nightmare for defense 
counsel, and it is not as far fetched or fantastical as might be imagined. Indeed, one of the 
Commission's "compensation consultants" has suggested to Appellant that he simply allow them 
to counsel with the claimant as to all undisputed matters. Appellant recalls the late Idaho 
Supreme Court Justice Alan G. Shepard's playfully sardonic observation offered to young 
lawyers that one really did not have much understanding of what it meant to practice law for the 
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first ten years out of law school. Indeed, it took Appellant ten years to fully appreciate the truth 
of Justice Shepard's observation, and the rather comic yet spectacular naIvete demonstrated by 
the compensation consultant's suggestion reflects the aggressive and uninformed posture towards 
claimants' counsel that appears to be becoming institutionalized within the lIC. 
As a practical matter, Appellant would not attempt to limit the scope of his representation 
to disputed matters, though it certainly would not seem unreasonable to him if other attorneys 
did. However, what the Appellant is being forced to do, is to tum down claimants who distrust 
their employer, believe they are being set up by the surety, and are more than willing to pay an 
amount as attorney's fees to be taken from their impairment rating whether disputed or not for 
the peace of mind of having an attorney. Of course, Appellant's response to such a scenario is 
not relevant to the issue of whether 17.02.08.033.01 impacts the scope of feasible employment 
and its implications under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but he offers his thoughts 
because the slow and steady attempt to get lawyers out of the workers' compensation field, and 
the indifference to such consequences evidenced on page 42 ofthe Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Relating to Counsel's Request for Approval of Attorney's foes, AR 245, 
should be of grave concern to this Court and to any lawyer who has taken an oath to "never 
reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed." 
9. The Regulation in Question Impacts Fundamental Rights In A Way That 
The Regulation In Rhodes Did Not 
Rhodes was decided applying a "rational basis" test rather than a heightened standard. 
"Because the challenged regulation creates no suspect or invidiously discriminatory 
classification and entangles no fundamental right, but involves economic and social welfare 
legislation, it must be tested under the restrained standard of equal protection review, the familiar 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
- 34-
rational basis test.,,16 Rhodes 139,470. Reading Rhodes and Curr together, Rhodes' assertion 
that the regulation Rhodes considered did not do any of the things proscribed on constitutional 
grounds by Curr is telling. Reading Rhodes and Curr together, the Rhodes Court implicitly 
concluded that the subject regulation did not abridge the substantive rights declared in Curr; that 
is, the regulation did not prohibit compensating "an attorney for acting solely as a counselor" or 
"fail[s] to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission 
for medical care or procuring an impairment rating" or make "suspect appellants' integrity in the 
eyes of their clients, thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship" or "preempts 
representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-508." Curr 692, 
l38. 
Unlike IDAPA 17.02.08.033, under consideration in this appeal, the regulation in Rhodes 
did not prevent an attorney from being paid attorney's fees other than with respect to the 
recovery of disputed benefits. A single example illustrates the difference between the two 
regulations. Under the regulation challenged in Rhodes, a workers' compensation claimant 
16 Since the Fourteenth Amendment discussed in Curr extends the protections of the Fifth Amendment to 
the states, the following language is instructive: 
'(T)he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from 
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the 
Fifth Amendment * * *.' Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411,3 L.Ed.2d 
1377. That right is therefore also included among the '(i)ndividualliberties fundamental to American 
institutions (which) are not to be destroyed under pretext of preserving those institutions, even from 
the gravest external dangers.' Communist Party of us. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 
U.S. 1,96,81 S.Ct. 1357, 1410,6 L.Ed.2d 625. 
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 270, 88 S. Ct. 419, 427, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967), (Brennen, 
Concurring.) See, also, Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623; Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 
352, 75 S.Ct. 790, 800, 99 L.Ed. 1129 (concurring opinion); cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 
350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10,60 L.Ed. 131; 
Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-590, 17 S.Ct. 427,431,41 L.Ed. 832; Powell v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684, 8 S.Ct. 992, 995, 1257,32 L.Ed. 253. 
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offered a Lump Sum Settlement could hire an attorney by the hour to review the agreement, 
advise him as to the wisdom of entering into it, and negotiate with the surety by proposing a 
counter offer. Once the negotiated Lump Sum Agreement was approved by the lIC, nothing in 
the Rhodes regulation would prohibit the claimant from paying the attorney, as long as the fee 
did not exceed the 25% limitation. Pursuant to the IDAPA 17.02.08.033, an attorney could not 
be paid a fee for such services. In view of both I.C. § 3-205 and common sense, can this really 
be what the legislature intended in passing I.C. § 72-803, the plain language of which simply 
authorizes the lIC to "approve" attorney's fees? Indeed, as IDAP A 17.02.08.033 is presently 
construed by the lIC, it would appear that an attorney is not even entitled to be repaid costs or 
disbursements out of the proceeds of a lump sum settlement unless he can demonstrate that the 
funds to be paid in consideration for the settlement were paid as the result of the resolution of a 
"dispute." (See the definition ofa "charging lien" in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(c).) 
Appellant respectfully suggests that when it comes to laws and regulations effectively 
controlling the practice of law, a higher standard should be utilized by this Court under the Idaho 
Constitution because the right to follow a recognized and useful profession of the practice of law 
is a fundamental right protected by a liberty interest, and because the regulations violate the 
separation of powers in three ways: Judiciary vs. Executive, Judiciary vs. Legislative Branch, 
and Legislative Branch vs. Executive. 
The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference 
with fundamental rights and liberties. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 
S.Ct. 2258, 2267-68, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1997). In addition to the freedoms explicitly 
protected by the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that other rights 
may be fundamental and subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. In order to determine whether 
a right is fundamental, a two-step analysis is undertaken. Id. First, the right must be 
shown objectively to" 'be deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if they were sacrificed,' " Id. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 787-88 
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(quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-38,52 
L.Ed.2d 531,539-40 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,58 S.Ct. 149, 151-
52,82 L.Ed. 288, 292 (1937». "Second, [the Court has] required, in substantive-due-
process cases, a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Id In 
determining whether a right is fundamental, "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and 
practices thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking.' " Id 
(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 
L.Ed.2d 261,273 (1992». 
State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 933-34, 231 P.3d 1016,1030-31 (2010), reh'g denied (May 5, 
2010). 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of the issues presented by this case cannot be more eloquently stated than 
has already been done by this Court: 
It is our belief that this legislative intention to insure adequate representation and claim 
prosecution requires the award of reasonable attorney's fees. Were the fees of attorneys to be 
kept artificially low, i.e., below market value on a per hour basis, the result would be a 
migration of legal talent away from this crucial area and a chilling effect on the ability of 
claimants to obtain representation. As the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated in Herndon 
v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434, 435 (1978): 
"If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there 
would be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate 
representation. Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain 
exceptional and well-qualified counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that 
courts foster and protect the ability of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his 
choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice which would discourage [ such] 
representation .... " 
Hogaboom 17,994. 17 Emphasis supplied. Though the common sense observation of this Court 
in Hogaboom that those who cannot pay an attorney a fair amount for his services will not be 
able to retain such services was essentially dismissed as speculation by the Rhodes Court (as was 
the testimony of attorney Alan Hull in this case by the lIC, see Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm 
Hearing Transcript p. 61. 14 to p. 101. 10, p. 161. 7 to p. 171. 11, and 181. 15 to p. 20 1. 12, 
17 The statute under consideration in Hogaboom was I.C. § 72-804, and not I.C. § 72-803 as in this case. 
Yet this distinction would not appear to undermine the logic of the quoted passage. 
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excerpts of that testimony contained in the Appendix to this brief, and Order on Claimant's 
Motion/or Reconsideration atAR 431-432), the relationship between and the ability to obtain 
legal services and the payment of adequate compensation therefore has long been a simple matter 
of judicial inference. In light of the Judiciary's historical recognition of the relationship between 
reasonable attorney's fees and the ability to obtain legal services, this Court should not tum a 
blind eye to the testimony of veteran workers' compensation defense attorney Alan Hull that the 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033, or at least the IIC's present interpretation of it, has resulted in an increase 
in workers' compensation claimants who cannot obtain counsel, made it more difficult to resolve 
such cases, and resulted in claimants who have the right to benefits simply giving up. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this case needs to be resolved by going back to the 
basics. The regulation of the practice of law is a matter within the sole province of the Judiciary, 
which has historically regulated compensation on the basis of reasonableness. I.e. § 3-205 not 
only recognizes the Judiciary's exclusive province in this regard, but enshrines it in statute by 
commanding that the "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at 
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." 
Nothing in I.C. § 72-803 indicates that the legislature intended to repeal I.C. § 3-205 or limit its 
application in the field of workers' compensation law, and nothing in either statute conflicts with 
the other. That there is a will on the part of the Executive to limit the measure and mode of 
compensation is beyond cavil, but the difference between political will and constitutional right is 
fundamentally the very reason for both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The IIC's 
interpretation of Rhodes suggests that we are drifting to a pass at which the constitutional 
guarantees recognized in Curr are guarantees only so long as there is no political will to 
overcome them. In its view, Curr's prohibitions had meaning only until a regulation did away 
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with them. Appellant does not believe that constitutional guarantees are as ephemeral as 
principals of common law, subject to change as each new opinion issues. Curr and Rhodes must 
be harmonized, just as I.C. § 3-205 and I.C. § 72-803 must be harmonized. 
The decisions in these consolidated cases denying attorney's fees must be reversed 
because the IIC lacks the statutory authority to limit attorney compensation to only those 
"services of the attorney [that] operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which 
the attorney seeks to be paid." Such authority was never delegated to the IIC by the legislature, 
and if it was, that delegation of power violated the doctrine of separation of powers both as to the 
Judiciary and the legislature. IDAPA 17.02.08.033 violates fundamental First Amendment, 
Substantive Due Process, and Liberty rights protected by the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
Appellant requests that the decisions in the consolidated cases be reversed, that IDAP A 
17.02.08.033 be declared to be beyond the statutory authority of the IIC or, ifnot, 
unconstitutional, and that the Commission be ordered to consider approval of the reasonableness 
of the attorney's fees claimed using the Hogaboom and Clark factors, or the factors contained in 
I.R.P.C. 1.5, or whatever factors this Court, exercising its sole prerogative to regulate the 
practice oflaw, deems applicable to the limited quasi-judicial function the IIC is empowered to 
perform by I.C. § 72-803. Appellant will stipulate that the IIC may do so in the absence of a 
valid regulation appropriately enacted within the constitutional and statutory limits of he IIC's 
quasi-legislative authority, knowing full well that the relatively small amounts directly at stake 
on this appeal at this point are far behind the financial point of no return, even if awarded on 
remand. Though the legal object of this appeal necessarily involves the recovery of those 
disputed attorney fees, the appeal was not motivated by a desire to recover them. Appellant's 
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motivation is simply this: For over thirty years, his firm has never turned down a workers' 
compensation client because there was not enough money to be made on the case. Even if the 
injury was small, the benefits to be derived limited and uncertain, and the time required to be 
committed to holding the hand of an often uneducated layman who felt overpowered, distrustful 
and unequipped to handle his or her own workers' compensation case would not justify the risk 
of resources, Appellant did not turn such cases down if there was any possibility, however slight, 
that there would be at least a small impairment award at the end of the case from which he could 
charge a fee. In hundreds of small cases, as in those in this appeal, Appellant's firm has 
dedicated their time and resources over periods of years, to such workers' compensation cases. 
Usually, at the end of the day, the compensation has been adequate. Despite the advice of most 
of Appellant's peers in the Bar, there has been no attempt made to screen worker's compensation 
cases to select only those that are most likely to result in significant remuneration. This 
Appellant has done, as have all who have worked in his firm, with a sense of pride, service to 
both the clients and the profession, and an understanding that it is a privilege and an honor to be 
asked to represent someone who is injured, worried about their future, and willing to repose their 
trust in Appellant's firm. It is because the principles presented by this appeal are dear to the 
attorneys and staff in Appellant's firm, that they are worth contesting before this Court; the 
money involved is insignificant, and it is almost certain that Appellant's firm could make more 
money in the future by simply screening cases and refusing to accept small cases with no express 
denial of benefits, than by prevailing here and containing to do so. 
Appellant does not suggest that this has been by any means heroic. However, he does 
respectfully suggest to the Court that he has done so in the firm belief that it is what has 
historically been expected of officers of the Court, and that handling cases on a contingent basis 
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comports with the aspirations of the judiciary as articulated above in Hogaboom. If the lIe's 
power to limit representation to disputed matters is confirmed, Appellant's ability to handle 
small cases in which there mayor may not be any permanent disability will be diminished. No 
attorney can handle a workers' compensation case on an hourly basis. No client can even hire an 
attorney to assist him on an hourly basis to review and finalize a Lump Sum Agreement and pay 
the attorney out of its proceeds, and every governmental entity will be free to "restrain by law" 
the ability of attorneys and clients to agree to the measure and mode of their compensation. 
Thus, what is at stake in this appeal truly is the regulation of the practice oflaw, and not just the 
reasonableness of attorney fees. 
As requested in the introduction to the argument section of this brief, Appellant asks this 
Court to simply acknowledge what the Legislature has already declared, which will fully resolve 
this appeal, and obviate the need to address the constitutionality of this and any subsequent 
similar regulations that are not limited to simply determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees 
without limiting their measure or mode. 
Respectfully submitted January 6, 2012. 
"Will Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
1. Key Provisions of Fee Agreements In All Three Workers' 
Compensation Cases On Appeal 
Waiver of Hourly Fee Representation 
"Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. I have read the foregoing and decline to 
retain the attorney on an hourly basis, this day of _____ _ 
200 [Claimant], Client." 
Percentage Contingent Fee 
"For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be 
in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client 
after execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a 
hearing. If Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at 
the time of the execution of this agreement, Attorney will not 
take a percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety 
discontinues or threatens to discontinue payment of said 
benefit; if Client has received an impairment rating which has 
been admitted and is being paid, Attorney will not take a 
percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless it is 
later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the 
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved 
after an appeal has been filed by either party." 
Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
lack of cooperation by Client." 
The Disclosure Statement Required by the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
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"In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case 
in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a 
hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a 
higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if 
you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition 
the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. I certify that I have read and understand 
this disclosure statement and Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms 
contained herein. DATED this __ day of , 200_ 
[Claimant], Client" 
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2. Excerpts from Testimony of Alan Hull Taken From Kulm Hearing 
Transcript 
MR. HULL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm here today to support Mr. Seiniger's claims 
and I'd like to give you a little background. A number of years ago I was called by then 
Commissioner Gettes to serve on a hastily assembled committee -- I think it was Jack 
Barrett and myself and I believe Jerry Goicoechea and Bob Huntley, to look at attorney 
fees, because they were getting a lot of pressure from then Governor Andrus. He wanted 
to reduce claimant's fees. What had happened was the legislature was in the process of 
dropping the -- reducing the Medicaid and I believe Medicare reimbursement rates and 
there was a family practitioner in Twin Falls who was the only doctor in Twin Falls 
taking these patients and she had got a lot publicity and the governor told us I'm going to 
have to reduce the rates on the doctors, because of budget constraints and I'm going to cut 
the lawyers, too. We negotiated for two or three days by phone, he was back east at a 
national governor's convention, and this rule was eventually adopted and the 25 percent 
attorney's fees came out at that time. 
Since that time we went over the law the Medicare and Medicaid rates have gone 
up, because people have not been able to find doctors to treat them. Since that time in my 
practice what I see are a lot more pro se claimants, because they cannot find attorneys 
who can represent them and I think when you -- anytime you cut a fee that an attorney 
has a part in earning, you're making that more and more of a problem for those people to 
find attorneys and, quite frankly, they tend to be thrown to the wolves in this litigation 
process. 
Whenever I have a pro se attorney I also ask for a status conference with the 
hearing officer assigned to the case, they go over the rules with the claimant, they are told 
that you're expected to abide by all of our rules and you will be held to the same standard 
as an attorney would be and at that point most of them just drop it. 
This -- this procedure is supposed to be simple and as summary as possible. It is 
not doing that. We are denying the ability to get counsel for so many claimants. 
In this case, as I understand it, Mr. Seiniger was hired on 5/30/07. A PPI rating 
was rendered by Dr. Beth Rogers on 11/7/07. There are a lot of factors that go into every 
case and in this case I was assigned to draft the lump sum settled. But in every case now, 
because of the Sixth Edition, and the ability of the Sixth Edition to end up in a zero 
percent impairment, even when you do a cervical fusion. I had a case involving that. The 
selection of a PPI doctor, the input they get from both sides, and whether or not a 
claimant's attorney are going to go out and spend their own money on a physician to do a 
rating, are critical to the recovery of a claimant. It's hard to tell a claimant's attorney to 
go out and spend two or three thousand dollars getting a rating and restrictions when you 
can't even be paid for what they are getting and I think by assuming -- and it appears to 
me that's what staff is doing in this case is assuming the PPI ratings are not the result of 
efforts of counsel, instead of assuming that anything that's generated after counsel 
appears should be presumed to be that which counsel earned and only deducted in the 
event that the -- showing that counsel did nothing to do that. I think by doing that you're 
denying people the ability to get counsel and because of that you're denying them a 
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hearing that's as simple and summary as possible and this is a growing trend and I would 
urge you to look at how your interpreting the rule or, if necessary, to go back and actually 
examine the rule and rewrite it. 
But the interpretation is up to you and we didn't see the interpretation where it's 
presumed that PPI wasn't subject to attorney's fees until about 12 years ago. I think that's 
a very dangerous presumption, because the PPI ratings can set up the entire case and an 
attorney should be compensated for the work they do in getting that to be sure that that 
claimant has available to him or her every benefit possible under the system. And by just 
-- what it looks like summarily saying you're not entitled to PPI, even though you have 
been in the case for five months before it was awarded, is simply not a reflection of 
reality how these things work now. And this is particularly true now with the Sixth 
Edition where the rating can be zero and I actually had two level fusion, cervical, that 
came out zero and claimant agreed. He said I'm perfect. He had an impairment on his 
shoulder, so he could settle the case. But this is a critical step and I think it's a step that is 
causing claimant's lawyers to turn down questionable cases and those are the people that 
probably need representation the most. 
So, I would urge you to interpret your statute -- your rule as there is an assumption 
on anything that comes -- is generated after counsel is retained is earned and let them take 
a fee out of that, if you need to go back and reexamine your rule. And if you look at the 
Hildebrand case, which is 1984 IC 0368, it certainly shows the duty on this Commission 
to continuously be reexamining your rules and your statutes for Constitutionality. Thank 
you. I'll be happy to answer any questions and I'll certainly stay for the hearing. 
Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 6 1. 14 to p. 10 1. 10. 
But I don't think that you can assume that these are necessarily controlling precedents, 
because I don't think the court has looked at what is the impact of that in the ability of 
people to find lawyers. You know what the government's done when people couldn't fmd 
doctors, they raised the rates for reimbursement. What are we going to do now? And 
these people are not doing well in these hearings, in spite of the best efforts of the hearing 
officer and in spite of the best efforts of the Commission, and I don't see anything in the 
IDAP A that requires one interpretation over the other. That was the case went up to them 
in each of those cases. I think this Commission needs to look at what is the impact of this 
and I think it ought to -- personally -- do you assume if it comes in, the benefit was paid, 
it wasn't awarded before and if it was awarded and paid after counsel comes on the case, 
you need to assume that they had something to do with it. What are you going to do in a 
case now --let's assume a person appears they may have no impairment or ten percent 
and you know that ifthere is an impairment there is a very large disability. Are you 
going to tell the attorney you can be hired, but only for the disability and we don't expect 
you to pay money to get an impairment rating, we are not going to pay you back for that 
effort. That's wrong. You know, it's just -- the interpretation is not working and I think 
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that it's time for this Commission to reexamine that and I think we all know that the court 
just reacts to what it gets, so -
Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 16 1. 7 to p. 17 1. 11. 
MR. HULL: First of all, let me refer to the court's language, because I think they knew 
the attorney who was before them in that case. So, I don't know that that case really 
stands for much of anything, other than they don't -- didn't like that attorney and he's no 
longer an attorney. Oftentimes in my practice I have seen adjusters and even sureties 
strongly recommend or insist that claimants go see an attorney to get the thing resolved. 
We all recognize the value of having an attorney on the other side, because oftentimes 
these cases can't get resolved that should be resolved until that happens. If we make it 
impossible by artificially eliminating what they may be receiving, we are not going to 
have that ability to do so and people are going to uncompensated that should be 
compensated. It clogs up the system. 
Having said that, I'm not suggesting that you have a carte blanche rule, I'm 
suggesting just utilizing -- if you want to use a calendar approach, a presumption that the 
person did something and certainly when you have a rating out there of 12 percent you 
have a real incentive to go out and get one you know that's going to be lower and pay it. 
In most of these cases, you know, with disability -- I don't care whether it's two percent or 
12 percent, because impairment -- disability includes impairment. The question is is 
there a rating and are there restrictions. That's what determines the value of these claims. 
And I think these attorneys are earning their fee and the proof of that seeing the kind of 
people who don't have attorneys and to me it's really increasing. 
I always ask the person at deposition, you know, have you talked to an attorney. 
Yeah, I've talked to an attorney, they wouldn't take my case. What happened? I was just 
told just go ahead and file and they will take care of you. I'm not being taken care of. 
People don't realize they are getting into a litigation process where, you know, 
you look at the attorneys doing it, everybody's experienced in this. It's almost like you 
get an attorney that doesn't do it, they need to hire a workmen's comp lawyer, because we 
are -- this is a -- people have a hard time understanding this system and harken back to 
the words of the court in Fowble, well, generally the Fund, if you buy a policy from 
them, pay benefits -- they were talking about the second injury fund. So, I understand 
that, you know -- I think the court reacts to what the Commission presents to it and the 
reasoning of the Commission. And if we may have to plow new ground here, I don't 
have any problem -- you know, suggesting you should, but I think you should. 
Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 181. 15 to p. 20 1. 12. 
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3. Early Statutes 
THE 
REVISED CODES OF IDAHO 
VOLUME IL 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PENAL 
PREPARED BY 
JOR1\! F. MACLANE 
CODE COMMISSIONER 
1908 
Snm--YoBX Co.. Pa:IlIfTI!IBS A:ND BINnmM 
Bo_ 
APPENDIX 
6 
Ch.6. COSTS 267 
to the service of a summons or other process, or of any paper to 
bring a party into contempt. 
Historical:. Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 4894. 
C. C. P. 1881, Sec. 690. 
California Legislation: Same: C. 
Service by Telegraph. 
C. P. 1872, Sec. 1016; Deering's Code. 
lb.; Kerr's Code. lb. 
S.ec. 4895. . Any summons, writ, or order in any civil suit or pro-
ceeding, and all other papers requiring' service, may be transmitted 
by telegraph for service in any place, and the telegraphic cOpy of 
such writ, or order, or paper so transmitted, may be served or exe-
cuted by the officer or person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and 
returned by him, if. anyreturn.be .requisite, in the . same manner, 
and with the same force and effeCt·· in all' respects, as the 'original 
thereof might be. if delivered to him, and the officer or person serv-
ing or executing the same has the same authority, and.is subject to 
the' same liabilities, as if the copy were the briginal. . The original, 
wl1en a writ or order, must also be filed in the cO,urt from which it 
was issued, and a. certified copy' thereof. preserved 'in' the' telegraph 
office from which it was sent. In sending it, either the original or the 
certified copy may be used by the operator for that purpos!'l. When-
ever any document to be sent by telegraph bears a seal, either pri-
"ate ,()J:: official, it is not neeessary for ~he operator, in sending the 
same, tq telegraph a description of the seal, or any words or device 
thereon, but the' same may be expressed' in the telegraphic copy by 
the letters "L. S." or by the word useal." 
HistOrical: Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 4895. 
C. C. P .. 1881, Sec. 691. 
California.LegislaUon: Same: C. 
C. P. 1872; Sec. 1017; I~eering's Code, 
tb.; Kerr's Code, ib. 
CHAPTER 6. 
OF COSTS. 
Section 
40900. 
4901. 
4902, 
4903. 
4904. 
4905, 
4906. 
4907. 
Parties entitled to costs, 
Allowance to plaintiff. 
Same; Several acti')llS m1 8!n-
gle cause. 
'Same: Allowance to defend-
ant. 
Discretionary allowanc.e. 
Severance of costs. 
Costs on appeal. , 
Fees of referees. 
4908. Costs of continuance. 
4909. .Costs in case of tender. 
Parties Entitled to Costs. 
Section 
4910. Actions by or aga!ni[lt . admin-
istratqrs.. etc:, 
4911. C()sts on review. of special pro-
ceedings. . 
4912. Taxation of costs, 
4913. Same: Costs' on appeal. 
4914. Insertion of cos,ts In judgment. 
4915. Secur.ity for costs. 
4916. Same:· Dlsmis,sal of action. 
4917. Costs"against the State. 
4918. Costs agaInst the county, 
.4919. Attorneys fees :Insults for 
wages. . 
. . Sec. 4900.. The. m~asure and mode of compensation of attorneys 
and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of 
the parties; but partes to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs 
and disbursements, as hereinafter provided. . . 
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GEN'ERAL LA'VS 
DF'rUE 
TERRITORY OF IDAHO, 
INCLUDIXG TilE 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PASS~:D AT 'I'll E 
ELEVENTH SESSION 
OF THE 
TERRITOI~IAL LEGISLA'rURE, 
CONVF.NED ON THE 
THIRTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER, A. D. 1880, AND ADJOURNED ON 
THE 'fENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY, A. D. 1881, 
AT 
BOISE CITY. 
A. J. BOYAKm, TERRITORT AL PRIN1'ER. 
1881. 
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160 1>lIS()ELLANEOrrs PROVISIONS. 
!'Iervire on nOll- S1<;O. 689. When a plaintiff ora defendant, who has 
residents. appeared, resides out of the Territory, and has no attor. 
ney in the action or proceeding, the service may be 
made on the Clerk for him. But in all cases where a 
party has an attorney in the act.ion or proceedinp:, the 
service of papers, when required, must be upon the at-
torney instead of the party, except of subprenas, of' 
Where a party 
has an attor-
ney, service 
I,hall be on 
such attorney. 
writs,and other process issued in the suit, and of pa-
pers to bring him into contempt.! If there be no Attor-
Preceding pro- lley of record service may be made upon the party. 
visions not to SEC.· 690. The foreO'oing provisions of this Ohapter 
apply to pro- d . h "'. ~. 
fR'erlillg tl. 0 not apply to t e serVIce of a summons 01' other PI"O-
bring partv ill- f to b . t . te to contempt, cess, Or 0 any paper rmg a par y mto con mpt. 
Semee by tela- SEC. 691. Any summons, writ, or order in any civil 
graph,. suit or proceeding, and all other papers reqniring service, 
may be transmitted by telegraph for service in any place, 
and the telegraphic copy of such writ, or order, or paper 
so transmitted, lllay be served or executed by the officer 
or person to whom it is sent for that pnr.p0se, and re-
turned by him, if any return be requisite, m the same 
manner, and wjth the same force and effect in all respects, 
as the or.iginal thereof might be if delivered to him, and 
the officer or person serving or executing the same has the 
same authority, and is suhject to thesfl.me liabilities. as if 
the copy were the original. The original, when a writ 01' 
order, mnst a.lso be filed in the Court fhnn which it was 
issued, and a certified copy thereof must be preserved in 
the telegraph office from which it was sent. In sending 
it, either the original or the certified copy may be nsed 
by the operator for that purpose. Whenever any d()cn~ 
ment to be sent by telegraph bears a seal, either privllte 
or official, it is not necessary for the operator, in sellding 
tIle same. to telegraph !l. description of the seal, .01' any 
words or device thereon, but the same may be expressed 
in the . copy by the letters "L. S.," or by the 
COllllwnsation SEO. 692. The measure and mode of compensation of 01 attorneys. 
attorneys' and counselors at law is left to the agreement, 
Costs to parties. express or implied, of the parties; hut parties to actions 
or . ngsare. entitled to costs and disbursements, 
of "ourse to 
pJaintifi: 
SEO. are course 
tiff~ upon a judgment in his favor, in the followhig 
cases: 
1. In an action for the recovery of real property; 
2. In an action to recover the possession of personal 
property, where the value of the propertyamOlllJ.ts to 
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Tit. XIV. Ok. VI. OF COSTS. 
Compensation 
of attorneys 
coats fio parties. 
When allowed of 
cour8e to 
pl&lntl1I. 
Sevel'f:l,l aotions 
broughton a 
~tf~~ :'~8~~~-ry 
costa In but one. 
Defendll.nt's 
costs o.llowoo In 
oerta:in caaes. 
Costs, when in 
tbe dlacrotloll of 
the oourt. 
pressed in the telegraphic copy by the letters "L S " .' .' , 
the word "seal." " '. 
CHAPTER VI. 
OF COSTS. 
S1I:CTION 
4900. Oompeneation of attorneys. Cost 
to parties. 
4901. Whena.llowed ofcouroetoplalntl1I. 
4902. Several actions brought on a .lng1e 
oanse of aotion can earry costs in 
but one. 
4903. D~~~:,:~ ~~~r:i:,s:~~:.n0Wed 
4904. Cool;9, when In the Iiisoretlon 01 
t.heoonrt. 
4905. When the several 'defenda.nt. a.re 
not united In Inter.st, COlts may 
be severed. 
4906. Costs 01 appeal discretionary with 
the court in ce.rta.in C8.Ses. 
4907. Beferee. fees. 
4908. OontlnU&ll08, oost. may be lmpoBed 
... condition of. 
BltCTtON 
4909. Costs when a telldt>r Is 
suit brought. 
4910. Cost. iD. action by or 
mlnlstrator, eta. 
4911 . Cost. on review other 
4912. ]j'nt:~Of an a.1ftda.vltto 
4913, Co~:.,~~~eo.l, how 
4914. Interest end cos. 
by the Olorlr. in 
4,916 . w~~::.~~~t~lJ!'~I::". ~:'~-~=!3 
4916. 
4917.· 
4918 . 
SECTION 4900. The measure and mode of cOlnp~lll8Iiti 
, of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the 1Ul"l'P.A,,,:' 
express or implied, of the parties; but parties to 
proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements, 
mafter provided. 
SEC. 4901. Costs are allowed of course to the 
upon a judgment in his favor, in the following CMes: 
1. In an action for the recOvery of real property; , 
2. In an action to recover the possession of personal 
erty where the value of the property amounts to 
dred dollars or over; such value shall be d.e,1 ,erlrnill~ 
the jury, court, or referee, by whom the action is 
3. In an action for the recovery of money or 
when plaintiff recovers one hundred dollars or over; 
4. In a special proceeding; 
5. In an action which ' involves the title or po:sse6s1on~ 
real estate, or the legality of any tax, uU·IJU"., ass,essII], 
toll, or municipal fine. 
SEC. 4902. When several actions are brought 
bond, undertakin~, promissory note, bill of 
other instrument In writins-, or in any other' case 
same cause of , action, agamst several parties 
have been joined as defendant in the same action1 
can be allowed to the plaintiff in more than one ot 
tions, which may be at his election, if the parties 
against in the other actions were at the (jUJUWUtUll,;t:lll"'"'-'~ 
the previous action openly: within this Territory, 
disbursements of the plaintIff must be allowed to him in 
action. 
SEC. 4903. Costs must be allowed, of course, to 
fendant upon a judgment in his favor in the actions 
tioned in section 490~t and in special proceedings. 
SEC. 4904. In omer actions than those mtm~llOUBU,:;j 
section 4901, costs may be allowed or not, 
may be apportioned between the parties, on the 
verse sides, in the discretion of the court, but 
be allowed in an action for the recovery of 
ages, when the plaintiff reco~ers less than one 
lars, nOr in an ;lction to recover the possession of 
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